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The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002: Implications for 
Compensation Contracts and Managerial Risk-Taking  
 
Abstract 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) introduced several governance reforms that 
considerably increased the total risk exposure of CEOs. We examine the effects of these 
regulatory changes on compensation contracts of CEOs and their effect on risk taking 
subsequent to SOX. We find that while overall compensation did not change, salary and 
bonus compensation increased and option compensation decreased following the passage 
of SOX. The sensitivity of CEO’s wealth to changes in shareholder wealth also decreased 
after SOX. These results indicate that the pay for performance sensitivity of CEO 
compensation has declined following SOX. Our results indicate that these changes 
reduced investments in research and development, and capital expenditures. We also 
document that the above changes in CEOs’ pay for performance sensitivities and their 
risky investments following SOX are associated with a reduction in stock return 
volatility. However, we do not find any evidence indicating that these changes are 
associated with lower future operating performance.  
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1. Introduction 
In response to the recent corporate scandals, the U.S Congress enacted the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act in 2002 (henceforth, SOX) aimed at regulating the governance of firms. The 
primary purpose of SOX is to rebuild investors’ confidence in capital markets. SOX 
introduces several provisions, such as Section 404 rules on internal controls, which are 
likely to prevent or limit fraudulent financial reporting. However, critics argue that SOX 
may not prevent future corporate scandals and is likely, in fact, to result in significant 
costs (see, for example, Ribstein, 2005).  
Our primary objective in this paper is to examine whether SOX had adverse 
economic consequences. Specifically, we begin by studying two implications of the 
governance regulations imposed by SOX: firms’ responses in terms of CEOs’ 
compensation contracts, and how CEOs’ responded to these changes in terms of their 
investments in risky projects.   
The motivation behind investigating changes in managerial actions after SOX is to 
assess whether the passage of SOX is costly to shareholders. If the structure of incentives 
of CEOs were optimal prior to SOX, then changes in these levels after SOX will result in 
changes in real decisions made by CEOs, and hence will be costly to investors.1 Thus, our 
third objective is to investigate whether changes in compensation contracts and risk-
taking activities by CEOs after SOX had adverse consequences on subsequent operating 
performance.  
                                                 
1 For example, Zhang (2007) estimates that, as a consequence of the passage of SOX, the market 
capitalization of the firms traded on US exchanges fell by $1.4 trillion. Since there are approximately 
10,000 publicly traded firms, the net effect of SOX is around $140 million per firm. This amount, in turn, is 
unlikely to simply reflect the present value of the incremental direct compliance costs of SOX. A switch to 
less risky corporate strategies (assuming the previous strategies were optimal) could easily result in a 
reduction of shareholders’ wealth in the magnitude documented by Zhang (2007). 
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Several mandates in SOX impose specific additional liabilities on CEOs. For 
instance, CEOs face higher risk from misstatements of financial information in the form 
of increased criminal and civil penalties, and broader financial reporting responsibilities, 
including the certification of financial statements and developing an internal control 
system for financial reporting. One likely consequence of these mandates is that firms 
alter compensation contracts to protect their CEOs from these added risks.  
We begin by examining changes in the total compensation, individual components of 
compensation (including salary, bonus, option grants), the ratio of incentive 
compensation to fixed salary, as well as changes in two commonly used pay for 
performance sensitivities (namely, the Jensen-Murphy statistic and portfolio equity 
incentives) of CEOs after the passage of SOX.2  
We do not find evidence that overall compensation levels increased after the passage 
of SOX.  However, we find that the levels of salary and bonus compensation increased 
after SOX, while the value of option grants decreased after SOX. Further, the ratio of 
incentive compensation (the sum of bonus, options and restricted stocks) to fixed salary 
declined after SOX. Thus, the evidence suggests that CEOs were given lesser incentive 
compensation in the post-SOX period, and firms switched to more bonus awards rather 
than option grants. This shift is likely to represent firms’ response for shielding 
executives from some of the risks imposed by SOX. We also document that the above 
compensation changes resulted in significant declines in the Jensen-Murphy statistic and 
                                                 
2 The Jensen-Murphy statistic is defined as the dollar change in CEO wealth for a $1000 change in firm 
value, and the measure of the CEOs portfolio equity incentives corresponds to a dollar change in CEO 
wealth for a 1% change in firm value (Core and Guay, 1999).  
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in CEOs’ portfolio equity incentives, indicating that pay for performance sensitivities for 
CEOs were significantly lower after the passage of SOX.          
The new regulatory environment and the resulting changes in the compensation and 
incentives of CEOs are likely to affect their real decisions, such as inducing them to 
deviate from value-maximizing actions. One potential deleterious effect of governance 
reforms such as SOX is reduced risk-taking activities by managers – incentives to 
undertake risks are reduced when managers face penalties for bad outcomes.3  
Our next objective is to examine whether there was a change in risky investments 
made by CEOs after the passage of SOX. We compute total risky investments as the sum 
of research and development expenditures, acquisitions, and net capital expenditures 
(capital expenditures less sale of property, plant, and equipment) made by the firms.4 We 
find that these risky investments declined significantly in the post-SOX period, even after 
controlling for the effects of the economic environment and compensation structure on 
executives’ real actions.   
 In our final analyses we examine the performance consequences of the changes in 
compensation and risky investments after SOX. Specifically, we investigate whether 
these changes are related to future operating performance. We also examine whether 
these changes are associated with future stock return volatility which is a summary 
measure of the consequences of all risky investments made by firms. We document that 
the changes in CEOs’ pay for performance sensitivities and their risky investments after 
                                                 
3 Note that the board can “undo” the negative incentives of the penalties by adjusting the CEO’s 
compensation package. Thus, only if the board chooses not to do so, then there will be consequences in 
terms of reduced risk taking. 
4 These variables have been used in the literature as measures of risky investments (e.g., Kothari, Laguerre, 
and Leone 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Verdi, 2007). 
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SOX are negatively related to future stock return volatility. However, we do not find 
evidence that these changes are detrimental to future operating performance.  
The economic implications of governance reforms form an important research topic, 
and there has been considerable academic interest in the consequences of SOX (e.g., Li, 
Pincus and Rego 2007; Cohen, Dey and Lys 2008; Engel, Hayes and Wang 2007; Leuz, 
Triantis and Wang 2007, among others). We contribute to this growing literature by 
providing evidence on the impact of the regulations introduced by SOX on compensation 
structures of CEOs and their investment decisions. Further, we investigate whether these 
changes had an impact on subsequent operating performance. This evidence is likely to 
be relevant to both academics and regulators, and consists of a useful addition to current 
debates on the costs and benefits of SOX.          
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the research 
questions and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the research design, including 
the data, summary statistics and the model used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the 
results of the tests. Section 5 discusses some additional analysis we conduct to relate our 
results to SOX, and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Research Questions and Hypotheses Development 
 Optimal contracting involves minimizing agency costs without unduly reducing the 
benefits of the agents. This involves encouraging the agent to take the owners’ interests 
into account without forcing her to bear too much of the firm’s risks and at the same time 
not to behave more cautiously than the owners would want her to. Regulation can affect 
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this in unpredictable ways, depending on how increased liability and regulation attributes 
affect the agents’ incentives.5  
 We examine the effect regulation can have on agents’ actions and how firms respond 
to them from the perspective of the rules imposed by SOX. Two related papers in this 
area include Wang (2005) and Carter, Lynch, and Zechman (2007). Wang (2005) 
examines changes in the level and structure of CFO compensation and documents a 
decrease (increase) in the weights on public performance measures for firms with strong 
(weak) board structures and high (low) proportion of uncontrollable risk after the passage 
of SOX. Carter, Lynch and Zechman (2007) document that firms placed more weight on 
reported earnings in the design of bonus contracts after the implementation of SOX.6   
 SOX requires firms to increase the quality of financial reporting and disclosures. In 
addition, Sections 302 and 304 of SOX require CEOs to return any incentive-based 
compensation they received in the event of subsequent accounting earnings restatements. 
This provision explicitly provides for liability up to the amount of incentive-based 
compensation for the misconduct by others in the organization, regardless of the CEO’s 
knowledge, even if the CEO were to exercise reasonable care in monitoring and 
instituting controls.  
 The above specific requirements impose additional liabilities on CEOs, and firms are 
likely to respond by increasing compensation levels in order to maintain the executives at 
their original utility levels.  On the other hand, there has been a lot of criticism 
regarding the high levels of CEO compensation, and the recent accounting scandals have 
                                                 
5 Prior studies have documented an increase in overall compensation levels as well as an increase in 
performance related pay following deregulation in the banking industry and the adoption of state-level anti-
takeover laws (Hubbard and Palia, 1995; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1999). 
6 See Hermalin and Weisbach (2005) for a theoretical framework for evaluating these reforms in SOX.  
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focused attention again on this issue. Moreover, several studies have documented that 
CEOs in the US are overpaid, and that option grants mainly contribute to the excessive 
CEO pay (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Jensen, Murphy and 
Wruck, 2004). Thus, if in response to the high publicity after the scandals and SOX, 
firms reduced option grants but did not increase other forms of compensation to make up 
for the difference, then there is likely to be a drop in overall observed compensation 
levels. We begin by examining the trend in total compensation levels in the period 
leading to SOX and after the passage of SOX.  
 Predictions regarding the individual components of compensation levels are not clear 
as well. If firms choose to compensate CEOs for the additional liability imposed on them 
by SOX, they can do so by increasing both salary and incentive-based compensation, by 
increasing salary levels only, by increasing the level of incentive-based compensation 
only (both bonus and stock-based compensation), or by altering the mix of incentive-
based compensation. For instance, executives may be awarded more bonus compensation 
and less option compensation, if the associated risk is lower with bonus compensation. 
Bonus awards are typically made with reference to some performance standard, and firms 
can always select a performance standard that is less risky.  The original utility level of 
the executive can be maintained by adjusting the salary component. Firms could also 
reduce option grants in the post-SOX period in response to criticisms on excessive CEO 
pay. Our second research objective is to examine changes in specific components of 
compensation structure in the post-SOX period. Specifically, we examine trends in the 
levels of fixed and incentive-based compensation, as well as changes in the ratio of 
incentive to fixed compensation post-SOX. 
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 We also investigate the implications of such changes in compensation structures for 
CEOs’ pay for performance sensitivities. Prior literature documents that the explicit 
relation between CEO stock and option holdings and shareholder wealth provides most of 
executives’ incentives (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Hall and Liebman, 1998). Thus, we 
examine changes in two pay for performance measures commonly used in the literature: 
the Jensen-Murphy statistic, defined as the dollar change in CEO wealth for a $1000 
change in firm value; and the measure of the CEOs portfolio equity incentives as defined 
in Core and Guay (1999), which corresponds to a dollar change in CEO wealth for a 1% 
change in firm value.   
Any changes in compensation contracts made after SOX could be merely cosmetic, or 
they could have real economic effects through executives’ observed actions. Moreover, 
by itself, regulation that imposes additional risks on executives is likely to induce them to 
respond in ways to reduce their risks of liability.  
Under SOX, CEOs and CFOs are required to vouch for their firms’ financial 
statements and internal controls systems, by certifying in each annual and quarterly report 
that “based on the officer’s knowledge” the statements fairly describe the financial 
condition of the company. This provision may impose costs based on a court’s ex-post 
judgment that the executive certified controls that proved to be inadequate. In other 
words, SOX penalizes executives for misconduct by others, even when they might have 
taken reasonable care in monitoring their subordinates ex ante. This could lead executives 
to avoid investing in projects that they do not have much control over, but will still be 
held liable for the outcomes. Second, the SOX regulation raises the cost of failure. These 
provisions therefore require executives to bear some of the risk of fraud formerly borne 
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more cheaply by diversified investors. This may induce the agents (in our case, the 
CEOs) to act more conservatively than the owners would prefer them to unless they are 
compensated for the additional risk. Our next objective is to investigate managers’ 
investment policies post-SOX by looking at their investments in research and 
development and capital expenditures.  
Note that firms could alter compensation structures that would prevent such declines 
in risk-taking incentives of managers. If firms respond to SOX by fully indemnifying the 
executives, then the additional liability may have little effect on their incentives and real 
actions. In this case, we would not observe a significant change in the risk-taking 
activities of executives.7 To be able to address whether these changes had any adverse 
consequences for subsequent firm performance, we examine whether compensation and 
risky investment variables are related to future return on assets after SOX. We also 
examine whether these variables are related to subsequent stock return volatility, which 
aggregates the risk-taking effects of several risky actions such as mergers, R&D 
investments, and capital expenditures (Hanlon, Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2004). Thus, any 
changes in risky investments after SOX are also likely to affect observed future stock 
return volatility.    
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Data and Summary Statistics 
Our sample is selected from the set of industrial companies, excluding utilities, 
financial, and transportation firms per the COMPUSTAT annual industrial and research 
                                                 
7 On the other hand, even fully indemnified executives may act more cautiously because of the risk of 
reputational harm, in which case we would still observe a drop in risk taking activity.  
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files, and EXECUCOMP for the period 1992-2006.8  Merging the COMPUSTAT and 
EXECUCOMP databases results in a sample of 1,279 firms with 14,013 firm-year 
observations.  This final sample represents only firm-year observations where data for all 
variables included in the analysis is available.   
Table 1 presents the mean and the median values of the main variables employed in 
the analysis. The sample is dominated by large firms, primarily due to the requirement 
that firm observations be present in the EXECUCOMP database. An analysis of the 
medians indicates that, consistent with the recent literature on executive incentive-based 
compensation, options form the dominant component of compensation for the sample 
firms, followed by salary and bonus compensation. The ratio of option and bonus 
compensation to salary indicates that on average the incentive-based compensation for 
the sample firms was more than double the fixed salary component.  
 
3.2. Model 
Compensation Structure and Risky Investments 
In analyzing CEOs’ action choices and their compensation, we take into account the 
endogenous relation between these variables. CEOs make action choices in response to 
the incentives provided to them through their compensation contracts, and executive 
compensation takes into account what actions CEOs are likely to take given their 
incentives. Thus, the action choice and the compensation structure are likely to be 
directly related to each other, and studying these choices in a single decision framework 
may lead to erroneous inferences.  
                                                 
8 Our sample begins from 1992 as EXECUCOMP does not have data prior to this year.  
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We employ a two stage least squares (2SLS) model as the empirical representation of 
the relationship between the investment choices of CEOs, and the components of their 
compensation. The structural equations for the two stage least squares regressions are the 
following: 
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In equation (1), we investigate the changes in two compensation variables, 
represented as COMP_VAR, which is either L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES or CASH_COMP. 
The variable L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the logarithm of [1%*(share price)*(number of 
shares held) + 1%*(share price)*(option delta)*(the number of options held)], and 
CASH_COMP is the sum of salary and bonus, divided by total compensation. For each of 
the dependent compensation variables, we include the other compensation variable as a 
control (represented by O_COMP_VAR in equation (1)) since compensation committees 
are likely to set each element of compensation conditioned on the other compensation 
variable.  
 In equation (2), our dependent variable measuring the total risky investments made by 
firms is represented by INVEST which is calculated as the sum of  research and 
development expenditures, acquisitions, and net capital expenditures (capital 
expenditures less sale of property, plant, and equipment) made by the firm divided by 
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average total assets. This is consistent with the measures of risky investments employed 
in prior studies (e.g., Verdi, 2007).9 
In the above system of equations, the investment variable, INVEST, and the 
compensation variables, L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES and CASH_COMP are likely to be 
jointly determined. We predict a positive association between INVEST and 
L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES, as such incentives are likely to induce executives to undertake 
more risky projects. However, the relation between INVEST and CASH_COMP is not 
clear. Berger et al. (1997) argue that CEOs with more cash compensation are more likely 
to be entrenched and will seek to avoid risk. In this case, we would observe a negative 
relation between INVEST and CASH_COMP.  On the other hand, CEOs with higher cash 
compensation are likely to be better diversified and have more money to invest outside 
the firm and therefore are less risk averse (Guay, 1999). Under this scenario, there will be 
a positive relation between INVEST and CASH_COMP.  
The control variables we use in equations (1) and (2) are consistent with those used in 
prior studies (e.g., Guay, 1999; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2006; Bens, Nagar and Wong, 
2003). In equation (1), LOGASSET is the logarithm of total assets which is our proxy for 
firm size. Larger firms require more talented managers who are more highly compensated 
(Smith and Watts, 1992). Under the typical assumption that managers’ utility functions 
exhibit declining absolute risk aversion, CEOs of larger firms are likely to have higher 
equity incentives (e.g., Core and Guay, 1999; Himmelberg et al., 1999). Thus we expect 
firm size to be positively related to both our compensation variables.  
The variable DEV_INC is the logarithm of (actual incentive level/predicted incentive 
level) for year t-1, where actual incentive level is the delta of the equity portfolio and 
                                                 
9 We set research and development equal to zero when it is missing in COMPUSTAT. 
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predicted incentive level is based on the Core and Guay (1999) model. We include this 
variable to control for the possibility that firms may provide compensation to CEOs in 
response to the extent to which their existing incentive levels have deviated from the 
optimal incentive levels, and expect DEV_INC to have a negative coefficient.  
The variable RETURN is the cumulative 12 months returns for year t for firm j. We 
expect a positive relation between compensation levels and RETURN because executives 
in better performing firms are likely to be awarded greater bonus and other incentive-
based compensations. We include the age of the CEO, AGE, as a control based on prior 
research that has shown CEO age to be significantly related to pay sensitivities (Gibbons 
and Murphy, 1992).  Further, pay sensitivities offered to CEOs have been shown to be 
strictly increasing in CEO reputation (Milbourn, 2003). To the extent the age of the CEO 
is correlated with the CEO’s reputation, we expect a positive association between CEO 
age and the compensation variables. On the other hand, compensation committees might 
award lower risk-taking incentives to older CEOs to prevent them from investing in 
excessively risky projects just before retirement. If this is true, we would find a negative 
relation between AGE and L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES.  
Finally, we include two dummy variables, TIME which is defined as the calendar year 
minus 1992, and SOX which takes a value of 1 if the observation is from year 2002 
through 2006. These variables capture whether CEO compensation has been increasing 
over time and whether there was a significant increase in these compensation variables 
after the passage of SOX.  
In our risky investments equation (equation (2)) we include control variables that are 
likely to be associated with investments as evidenced in prior studies. We include the 
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lagged investment variable, Lag_INVEST in the above regressions to control for any 
omitted correlated variables. Prior research has shown that these investment choices are 
significantly associated with the lagged values of these variables (e.g., Bens et al. 2003). 
As in prior literature, we include LOGASSET (defined earlier) to proxy for firm size and 
expect a negative relation between INVEST and LOGASSET. We also include 
LOGSALESΔ defined as the change in the natural logarithm of sales from the prior year 
to measure the growth rate in sales of the firm, and expect a positive relation for this 
variable (Coles et al., 2006).  
Guay (1999) shows that firms with greater growth opportunities provide more risk-
taking incentives and that firm risk is indeed greater when managers have more risk-
taking incentives. Thus, we include the market to book ratio, M_B, as the measure of 
growth opportunities and expect a positive coefficient on this variable. We control for the 
operating uncertainty by including the standard deviation of ROA over the five years 
period prior to the current year (STDROA), and expect that more risky investments are 
associated with more uncertainty. Bhagat and Welch (1995), in a study of R&D 
expenditures, show that in addition to the market-to-book ratio, a firm’s stock returns can 
affect the investment decision. We also include the cumulative 12 months stock returns as 
a control variable and expect a positive relation between stock returns and risky 
investments. Apart from being a measure of performance, high stock returns are also 
likely to signal future opportunities and lower current cost of capital, and managers in 
such firms are likely to increase investments in risky projects.  
Finally, we use the age of the CEO, AGE, to control for the level of risk aversion of 
CEOs. Older executives who are approaching retirement may have lesser incentives to 
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undertake risky projects. Dechow and Sloan (1991) document that CEOs in their final 
years in office reduce research and development spending, presumably to increase 
reported earnings. Thus, we expect negative coefficients for AGE.  
The variable TIME  captures the trend over time in the corresponding dependent 
variables. The dummy variable SOX  captures the change in the risky investments by 
CEOs and the changes in compensation structures after the passage of SOX.10   
 
Impact on Future Return Volatility and Future Operating Performance  
Next, we investigate the performance consequences of any changes in compensation 
contracts and CEOs’ investment choices after SOX. We study whether compensation and 
risky investments of CEOs’ after SOX are related to one year ahead stock return volatility 
and one year ahead return on assets.11 We perform the following OLS regressions:  
, 1 0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8
9 10
11
_ _ _ _
_
_ _ _




STD RET L EQUITY INCENTIVES CASH COMP INVEST
LEVERAGE FIRM AGE LOGASSET SOXTIME
L EQUITY INCENTIVES SOX CASH COMP SOX
INVEST SOX
α α α α
α α α α α
α α
α ε
+ = + × + × + ×
+ × + × + × + × + ×
+ × × + × ×
× × ++
….(3) 
, 1 0 1 2 3









ROA L EQUITY INCENTIVES CASH COMP INVEST
SALES STDROA SOXTIME
L EQUITY INCENTIVES SOX CASH COMP SOX
INVEST SOX
α α α α
α α α α
α α
α ε
+ = + × + × + ×
+ × + × + × + ×
+ × × + × ×
+ × × +
        .…(4) 
                                                 
10 We also repeated the above tests by including cash flows from operations,CFO , in the two equations to 
proxy for the real economic environment and performance. We include this variable to control for the effect 
of economic activity on firms’ research and development expenses and capital expenditures, and on the 
incentives offered to them. Cash flow from operations is positive and significant in both cases, but the 
results for the other variables are materially unchanged. The results remain unchanged on repeating the 
tests using the annual percentage change in real GDP instead of cash flow from operations to control for 
overall changes in macroeconomic conditions.  
11 When we compute ROA we subtract out research and development expenses to prevent any mechanical 
relations with the variable INVEST on the right hand side of the equation.  
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 In equation (3), STD_RET is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns, 
LEVERAGE is defined as total debt divided by total assets and FIRM_AGE is defined as 
the number of years the firm appears on COMPUSTAT. In equation (4), the dependent 
variable is ROA, the return on assets defined as income from continuing operations 
divided by total assets and SALES are total sales for the year. All other variables are 
defined as before.  
The specifications for the above models and the control variables we consider are 
based on prior studies in the area. In particular, we refer to Guay (1999) and Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen (2006) to motivate the inclusion of control variables in equation (3) 
and Core et al. (1999) for specification (4). We include a measure of leverage in equation 
(3) based on prior research that suggests that financial leverage creates incentives for 
managers to assume excessively risky projects on behalf of shareholders (e.g., Harris and 
Raviv, 1991; Leland, 1998). We thus expect a positive relation between STD_RET and 
LEVERAGE. We control for firm age, FIRM_AGE, in equation (3) because younger firms 
are likely to experience greater stock return volatility (e.g., Pastor and Veronesi, 2003; 
Hanlon, Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2004). Consistent with prior studies, we expect a negative 
relation between firm size, LOGASSET, and stock return volatility, because smaller firms 
are likely to be riskier (Hanlon, Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2004).  
As in prior studies, we include SALES and STDROA as controls in equation (4). We 
include STDROA given the Core et al. (1999) argument that one needs to control for any 
relation between firm risk and future reported earnings, and expect a negative coefficient 
for STDROA. Further, there is prior evidence of a negative relation between future 
operating performance and stock return volatility (Minton, Schrand and Walther, 2002). 
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Given that earnings volatility is likely to be reflected in the standard deviation of ROA, 
we expect a negative relation between future ROA and STDROA. We predict a positive 
relation between future ROA and SALES because firms with better current sales are 
expected to perform better in the future. Finally, we include industry dummies (IND) in 
equation (3) and (4) to control for any unmodeled differences in stock return volatility 
(future performance) that may covary with industry. The next section discusses the 
results of the hypotheses tested.  
 
4. Results  
Section 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the individual components of 
compensation, the incentive compensation–salary mix, the pay for performance variables, 
the variables measuring risky investments, future stock return volatility and future return 
on assets, over time. Section 4.2 presents the results for the various compensation 
variables in equation (1), Section 4.3 discusses the results for the risky investment 
variables corresponding to equation (2), and Section 4.4 presents the results for the future 
return volatility and future operating performance as described in equations (3) and (4). 
All results reported in Tables 2, 3, and 4 are based on robust standard errors (see 
Petersen, 2007). 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics: Executive Compensation Structure and Risky Investments  
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the total compensation (TOTAL), salary 
(SALARY), bonus (BONUS), option grants (OPTION), the two pay for performance 
measures, namely the Jensen-Murphy statistic (JENSEN_MURPHY) and equity 
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incentives (EQUITY_INCENTIVES), the ratio MIX, which is the ratio of OPTION plus 
BONUS over SALARY, the investment variable, INVEST, the future stock return volatility 
(STD_RET) and future return on assets (ROA). We also separately examine the trends in 
the two primary components of the INVEST variable, namely research and development 
expenses, RD, and capital expenditures, CAPEX. We summarize the data by estimating 
the following regressions.   We regress each of the variables of interest on a time trend 
and a dummy variable taking the value of one in the post-SOX period (2002 onwards) 
and zero otherwise.  We choose this procedure to describe the variables given the events 
in the last decade (such as the bursting of the stock market bubble, and the corporate 
scandals), as many of our variables may exhibit significant time trends (non-stationarity), 
rendering a traditional summary statistics uninformative. 
The results indicate that total compensation has been significantly increasing over 
time, and it increased after the passage of SOX although this increase is not statistically 
significant. Further, there were significant over-time decreases in both salary and bonus 
compensation, and an over-time increase in stock options, which is consistent with the 
trend in stock option compensation documented in the literature. The dummy variable for 
the post-SOX period is positive and significant for salary and bonus compensation, and 
negative and significant for options. These results indicate the CEOs were granted less 
options after SOX, but their salary and bonus compensations were significantly higher. 
Firms could have substituted between incentive-based compensations by switching more 
to bonus awards due to the increased publicity of excessive option grants to CEOs, 
particularly after the accounting scandals. The ratio of incentive-based compensation to 
 19
salary, MIX, also increased over time, with a significant decrease following the passage 
of SOX.  
 Both the pay for performance variables, JENSEN_MURPHY and       
EQUITY_INCENTIVES increased over time, with significant declines after SOX. This is 
consistent with the declines in the option-based compensation after SOX. The trends in 
the above compensation and incentive variables are depicted graphically in Figures 1A 
through 1E.   
 The results for the investment variable INVEST, and its components RD and CAPEX, 
indicate significant over-time increases in risky investments. The dummy variable for the 
post-SOX period is negative and statistically significant for all three variables, suggesting 
that the passage of SOX was associated with a decline in executives’ spending on risky 
investments. Figure 2 illustrates these trends over the time period studied.  
 The trends in stock return volatility indicate that STD_RET increased significantly 
over time and decreased significantly after the passage of SOX. This is consistent with a 
decline in overall risk-taking activities of executives after SOX. The future return on 
assets, ROA, shows no significant increasing trend over time, however, there is a 
significant decrease in operating performance after the passage of SOX. 
 In summary, the above preliminary analysis indicates that following the passage of 
SOX, there was a shift in the compensation structure towards more fixed salary, more 
bonus compensation and less option-based compensation. Although we find evidence that 
firms altered the structure of CEO compensation, we do not find a statistically significant 
increase in overall compensation levels after SOX. The negative publicity regarding 
excessive levels of CEO compensation, particularly during the accounting scandals 
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period, could have resulted in firms being more conservative in terms of overall 
compensation packages offered to CEOs. The trend towards more fixed versus incentive-
based compensation after SOX is likely to be related to the requirement in SOX that 
executives need to reimburse incentive-based compensation following accounting 
misstatements. 
 These preliminary results indicate that the above compensation changes had some 
real economic effects as well. Specifically, there appears to have been a significant 
decline in risky investments by firms in the post-SOX period as compared to the period 
prior to SOX. The results on the future stock return volatility are consistent with such a 
behavior. The effects of the regulations in SOX on two primary components of 
compensation, equity-based incentives and cash compensation, and CEOs’ investments in 
risky projects are more formally investigated in the next two sections. 
 
4.2. Compensation Structure   
Table 3, Panels A and B summarizes the results of equation (1) for the various 
compensation variables. Panel A (left column) reports the results when 
L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dependent compensation variable, and Panel B (right 
column) reports the results when CASH_COMP is the dependent compensation variable. 
We first discuss the results in Panel A. 
Consistent with the results of the summary statistics, equity incentives of CEOs 
increased over time and declined significantly after SOX. This trend is likely to be due to 
the decline in option-based compensation, which forms a significant part of the equity 
incentives. We obtain a positive coefficient for INVEST, consistent with the notion that 
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higher incentive-based compensation is associated with more investments in risky 
projects. However, the interaction term INVEST×SOX is negative and statistically 
significant, providing evidence that in the post-SOX period there was a decrease in risky 
investments. One possible explanation for this result is that although options awarded to 
CEOs after SOX provided them with incentives to invest in risky projects, they 
reallocated investment dollars to less risky projects that are not captured by our 
investment measure. Another possibility is that given that CEOs are required to return 
incentives-based compensation and stock profits following restatements after SOX, the 
more equity incentives they have, the more wary they are of investing in risky projects 
following SOX.  
For the control variables, as expected, for the equity incentives variable, a positive 
and significant coefficient is obtained for LOGASSET suggesting that larger firms offer 
higher equity incentives to their CEOs. As in Core and Guay (1999), a negative and 
significant coefficient is obtained for DEV_INC, indicating that the equity incentives 
awarded to CEOs depends on the extent to which their existing incentives deviate from 
optimal levels. We obtain a positive and significant coefficient for RETURN, suggesting 
that CEOs of better performing firms have higher levels of equity incentives.  We obtain 
a positive and significant coefficient for O_COMP_VAR (which is CASH_COMP in this 
case), implying that CEOs with more equity incentives also get more cash compensation.  
The results in Panel B indicate that, as in the summary statistics, cash compensation 
decreased over time, but increased significantly after SOX.  This is also consistent with 
the claim that after SOX firms redesigned compensation contracts to provide more cash-
based compensation to their CEOs. As with equity incentives, we also obtain a positive 
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coefficient for INVEST for cash compensation. This is consistent with the argument in 
Guay (1999) that CEOs with more cash compensation are better diversified and are less 
risk-averse. Thus, they are likely to invest in more risky projects.  
The interaction term INVEST×SOX is positive and statistically significant, providing 
evidence that in the post-SOX period, corresponding to an increase in cash compensation, 
there was an increase in risky investments. This implies that in the post-SOX period 
higher levels of cash compensation to CEOs are more likely to have reduced their risk 
aversion as per the argument in Guay (1999). This result may appear surprising given the 
earlier result in Panel A supporting the claim that CEOs are likely to be more wary after 
SOX and invest less in risky projects. However, it is possible that given that a major part 
of cash compensation is salary, which is not subject to the same return policy following 
restatements as incentive-based compensation is, CEOs with more cash compensation are 
more willing to invest in risky projects.  
For the other control variables, we find a positive and significant coefficient for 
LOGASSET, suggesting that CEOs of larger firms get more cash compensation, which we 
interpret as reflecting firms’ demand for higher-quality managerial talent. The coefficient 
on the stock return variable RETURN exhibits a positive and significant association with 
cash compensation consistent with existing evidence in the literature (e.g., Core et al., 
1999). As expected, we obtain a positive and significant coefficient for O_COMP_VAR 
(which is L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES in this case), confirming the results in Panel A that 
CEOs with more equity incentives also get more cash compensation.  
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As suspected, the variable DEV_INC is not statistically significant. The variable AGE 
is not significant for both L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES and CASH_COMP. The next section 
formally examines changes in risky investments by CEOs in the period after SOX. 
 
4.3.Investment Decisions 
Table 4, Panels A and B summarizes the results of equation (2) of the system of 
equations discussed in Section 4. Panel A (left column) reports the results when the 
compensation variable is L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES, and Panel B (right column) reports 
the results when the compensation variable is CASH_COMP. The results for the two 
compensation variables are similar and we discuss only Panel A, but point out the 
differences in results.    
The results for the risky investments are also similar to the results presented in Table 
2. Investments in risky projects increased over time, while there was a significant decline 
in risky investments by CEOs in the post-SOX period. One interpretation of this evidence 
is that after the passage of SOX, increased risk aversion on the part of executives resulted 
in their spending less on risky projects.  
Both equity incentives and cash compensation are associated with more risky 
investments. This is consistent with the claim that equity incentives and cash 
compensation (by reducing risk aversion of CEOs) provide CEOs more incentives to 
substitute towards more risky investments.   The results for the interaction terms indicate 
that _ _L EQUITY INCENTIVES SOX×  is negative and significant, but the coefficient 
corresponding to _CASH COMP SOX×  is positive and significant. These results are 
consistent with those reported in the previous section. As discussed in the previous 
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section, CEOs with incentive compensation could be more wary after SOX due to the 
policy that requires them to return any incentive-based compensation following an 
earnings restatement. There is a possibility that CEOs could have reallocated investment 
dollars to lesser risky projects which is not captured by our measures. However, this 
concern is less for cash compensation which is likely to explain the positive coefficient 
on the interaction term, _CASH COMP SOX× . These results are consistent with greater 
risk aversion on the part of CEOs after the passage of SOX.12   
Among the control variables, as expected, the lagged value of risky investments, 
Lag_INVEST, is positive and highly significant. Consistent with prior studies, risky 
investments are negatively related to RETURN and LOGASSET, and positively related to 
the market to book ratio, M_B. The coefficient for ΔLOGSALES is negative and 
significant. The coefficient for STDROA is positive and significant as expected, 
indicating that more risky investments are related to higher operating uncertainty. The 
coefficient corresponding to AGE is negative and significant, as expected. This supports 
prior results in the literature that older managers, who are likely to retire soon, reduce 
their investments (e.g., Dechow and Sloan, 1991 in the context of R&D expenses).  
 
4.4. Economic Consequences of Changes in Compensation and Risky Investments 
Table 5 summarizes the results of equation (3) which examines the relation between 
compensation and risky investments and the future standard deviation of stock returns. 
As expected, we find that STD_RET is positively and significantly related to 
                                                 
12 A caveat: although the finding of changes in compensation structure and a decline in risk taking activity 
in the period following the passage of SOX does provide evidence of an impact of this new regulation, we 
cannot attribute these changes solely to SOX due to a number of concurrent events in the post-SOX period. 
Nevertheless, we conduct additional analyses in Section 5 to address this issue.  
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L_EQUITY_INVESTMENTS and INVEST.13 Thus, future stock return volatility is 
associated with higher equity incentives for CEOs and riskier investments. We get a 
negative and significant coefficient for CASH_COMP indicating that firms with a higher 
proportion of cash in the compensation structure have lower standard deviation of stock 
returns. 
The variable TIME is positive and significant, suggesting that stock return volatility 
has increased over time, and the variable SOX is negative and significant indicating a 
reduction in volatility in the period following SOX. Thus, there appears to be an overall 
decline in risky investments made by firms after SOX. This is consistent with our results 
in the previous section. The interaction term L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES×SOX is negative 
and significant, consistent with the results discussed in Section 4.2. If executives with 
more equity incentives invest less in risky projects post-SOX, this would translate into 
lower future standard deviation of stock returns. We also find that the term INVEST×SOX 
is negative and significant. This suggests that firms with more risky investments after 
SOX are associated with lower standard deviation of returns. One explanation for this 
result is that CEOs are likely to have reallocated dollars to relatively less risky projects 
among the available pool of investments after SOX, which translates into lower standard 
deviation of stock returns. These results corroborate the notion that there is likely to be 
greater risk aversion on the part of CEOs after SOX.  
Consistent with predictions and prior studies, smaller firms, firms with more leverage 
and younger firms exhibit greater future stock return volatility. Thus, overall, the 
                                                 
13 We also repeated our tests by substituting the variables MIX and OPTION in place of 
L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES, and the results are similar to those obtained when L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES is 
used. Thus we only report the results with L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES, but the results for the other two 
variables are available on request.  
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inferences from these set of results are consistent with the prediction that incentives 
provided to CEOs and their risky investments after SOX reflect greater risk aversion on 
their part as reflected in future stock return volatility.  
Table 6 summarizes the results of equation (4) which examines the relation between 
compensation and risky investments and the future operating performance of the firm as 
proxied by the future return on assets. Future operating performance has been increasing 
over time, but consistent with our earlier results, there is a significant decline after SOX. 
We find that both equity incentives and cash compensation are associated with higher 
future operating performance. We also find a positive relation between risky investments 
and future return on assets. However, none of the interaction terms, 
L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES×SOX, CASH_COMP×SOX and INVEST×SOX are significant, 
suggesting that these did not incrementally affect future performance after the passage of 
SOX. Among the other variables, as in prior studies, SALES is positive and significant 
and STDROA is negative and significantly associated with future firm performance. 
Overall, we do not find evidence suggesting that changes in the compensation structure of 
CEOs and risky investments made by them after SOX had adverse consequences for 
subsequent operating performance. 
 
5. Additional Tests: Interpreting the Evidence in Relation to SOX  
 One limitation of this study lies in attributing the observed changes to SOX per se. 
The problem arises because the SOX Act was imposed on all U.S. publicly-traded firms 
and hence it is difficult to find a control group of firms that is not affected by SOX and is 
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comparable to U.S. firms.14 In this section we perform a test in order to have some 
assurance that we can attribute the above results to the passage of SOX as opposed to 
other concurrent events.  
 We posit that managers in firms that are mostly affected by SOX are likely to be more 
risk averse post-SOX and are thus likely to make more reductions in risky investments 
post-SOX. To identify such firms, we consider a set of key legislative events related to 
the passage of SOX as identified in Zhang (2007). These events are described in Table 7, 
Panel A, and are events which witnessed significant negative market reactions. We 
accumulate the abnormal stock return for every firm in our sample during these event 
windows and use these cumulative abnormal returns to form deciles based on the extent 
of the negative reaction. Decile (1) corresponds to the portfolio of firms that had the most 
negative impact, i.e., the lowest cumulative abnormal stock returns around the above 
events, and decile (10) corresponds to the portfolio of firms that had the least negative 
impact. For each one of the deciles, Table 7, Panel B reports the average investments in 
risky projects, INVEST, and the stock return volatility, STD_RET (a summary measure of 
aggregate risk-taking effects), for two time periods: before the passage of SOX 
corresponding to the period 1997-2001 and after the passage of SOX corresponding to 
2002-2006.  
 The results indicate that for all firms there were significant declines in risky 
investments and in the standard deviation of stock returns, which is consistent with our 
prior results. Moreover, we find some support that the decline was greater for firms with 
                                                 
14 Although there are studies that analyze the effects of SOX on foreign firms (such as Berger et al., 2006) 
which are likely to have a smaller benchmark problem, it is not clear that we can extrapolate their findings 
to U.S. firms (Leuz, 2007).  
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more negative reactions to SOX. The difference between the INVEST and STD_RET for 
firms in decile (10) and decile (1) is negative and statistically significant supporting the 
claim that reductions in risky investments were significantly more in firms with the 
greatest negative reactions to SOX as compared to firms with the least negative reactions.  
 We repeat this analysis by dividing firms into three groups (results reported in Table 
7, Panel C) and get the same results. Although not conclusive, this analysis provides us 
with more confidence in attributing the changes we document primarily to the additional 
liabilities imposed by SOX on executives.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 This paper investigates the changes in the compensation structure of CEOs and their 
risk-taking activities after the passage of SOX. We document increases in salary and 
bonus compensation, and decreases in option-based compensation in the period after 
SOX. The proportion of incentive-based compensation to fixed salary and the pay for 
performance sensitivities for CEO also declined after SOX.  
 We next investigate whether the new regulations and the resulting changes in CEO 
compensation structure had any economic effects in terms of real decisions made by 
CEOs. We find that, after controlling for the compensation structure on executives’ 
action choices, there was a significant decline in risky investments by CEOs after the 
passage of SOX. We also document that the changes in equity incentives and risky 
investments are negatively related to the future stock return volatility. However, we find 
no evidence that these changes are detrimental to future operating performance.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  
1992 – 2006, N= 14,013 
Variable Mean Median 
   
TOTAL (000’s $) 2279.98 1465.22 
SALARY 0.36 0.29 
BONUS 0.19 0.17 
OPTION 0.33 0.31 
MIX 3.21 2.08 
JENSEN_MURPHY(‘000$) 32.24 29.54 
EQUITY_INCENTIVES(‘000$) 1276.75 375.24 
AGE 57.00 57.00 
TENURE 60.00 31.00 
INVEST 0.14 0.08 
RD 0.05 0.01 
CAPEX 0.08 0.05 
STD_RET 0.411 0.363 
ROA 0.041 0.053 
SIZE 1791.40 761.732 
GROWTH 0.15 0.10 
CFO 0.12 0.11 
   
TOTAL is total compensation, where total compensation is variable TDC1 from ExecuComp; SALARY is 
the salary received by the CEO of the firm as a percentage of total compensation; BONUS  is the bonus 
compensation received by the CEO of the firm as a percentage of total compensation; OPTION is the 
average Black-Scholes value of options received by the CEO of the firm as a percentage of total 
compensation; MIX is the sum of the Black-Scholes value of option grants plus bonus compensation and 
restricted stock grants , all divided by the salary of the CEO; JENSEN_MURPHY is defined as: (the number 
of shares held divided by common shares outstanding)*$1,000+(the number of stock options held divided 
by common shares outstanding)*(option delta)*$1,000; EQUITY_INCENTIVES are defined as: 1%*(share 
price)*(number of shares held) + 1%*(share price)*(option delta)*(the number of options held); AGE is the 
CEO’s age; TENURE is the number of months the CEO has been in office at the time of the current annual 
report date; RD is the research and development expenditures made by the firm scaled by average total 
assets; CAPEX is net capital expenditures (capital expenditures less sale of property, plant, and equipment) 
made by the firm divided by average total assets;  ; INVEST is total investments calculated as the sum of  
research and development expenditures, acquisitions, and net capital expenditures (capital expenditures less 
sale of property, plant, and equipment) made by the firm divided by average total assets; STD_RET is 
measured as the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns; ROA is the return on assets, defined 
as income from continuing operations divided by average total assets; SIZE is the market value of the firm 
at fiscal year end; GROWTH is the growth in sales for the year; CFO is the cash flow from operations 





Table 2: Summary Statistics of Risky Investment and CEO 
Compensation Measures over Time 
1992 – 2006, N=14,013 
 
SOXTimeSOXTimeDep jq ××+×+×+= χγβα  Dependent Variables 

































































































***Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  T-
statistics in parentheses are based on robust firm-clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2007). 
 
TOTAL is total compensation, where total compensation is variable TDC1 from ExecuComp; SALARY 
is the salary received by the CEO of the firm as a percentage of total compensation; BONUS  is the 
bonus compensation received by the CEO of the firm as a percentage of total compensation; OPTION is 
the average Black-Scholes value of options received by the CEO of the firm as a percentage of total 
compensation; MIX is the sum of the Black-Scholes value of option grants plus bonus compensation 
and restricted stock grants, all divided by the salary of the CEO; EQUITY_INCENTIVES are defined as: 
1%*(share price)*(number of shares held) + 1%*(share price)*(option delta)*(the number of options 
held); JENSEN_MURPHY is defined as: (the number of shares held divided by common shares 
outstanding)*$1,000+(the number of stock options held divided by common shares 
outstanding)*(option delta)*$1,000; INVEST is total investments calculated as the sum of  research and 
development expenditures, acquisitions, and net capital expenditures (capital expenditures less sale of 
property, plant, and equipment) made by the firm divided by average total assets;  RD is the research 
and development expenditures made by the firm scaled by average total assets; CAPEX is net capital 
expenditures (capital expenditures less sale of property, plant, and equipment) made by the firm divided 
by average total assets;  STD_RET  is measured as the annualized standard deviation of daily stock 
returns; ROA is the return on asset defined as income from continuing operations divided by average 
total assets;  Time is defined as the calendar year minus 1992; SOX is a dummy variable taking a value 
of 1 if the observation is from year 2002 through 2006.   
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Table 3:Compensation Determinants 



















Compensation Variable ( jqVARCOMP _ )  
Panel A Panel B 
 L_ jtINCENTIVESEQUITY _  
Coef. 
(t-stat) 











































   
N 14,013 14,013 
R-SQUARE 0.235 0.227 
***Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  T-statistics in 
parentheses are based on robust firm-clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2007). 
Table 3 presents 2-SLS regression results. COMP_VAR and O_COM_VAR is either L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES 
or CASH_COMP, respectively; L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES are defined as the logarithm of: 1%*(share 
price)*(number of shares held) + 1%*(share price)*(option delta)*(the number of options held); CASH_COMP 
is the sum of salary and bonus, divided by total compensation; LOGASSET is the logarithm of total assets; 
INVEST is total investments calculated as the sum of  research and development expenditures, acquisitions, and 
net capital expenditures (capital expenditures less sale of property, plant, and equipment) made by the firm 
divided by average total assets;  STD_RET  is measured as the annualized standard deviation of daily stock 
returns; DEV_INC is the logarithm of (actual incentive level/predicted incentive level) for year t-1, where 
actual incentive level is the delta of the equity portfolio and predicted incentive level is based on Core and 
Guay (1999) model; RETURN is the cumulative 12 months returns for year t for firm j; AGE is the CEO’s age; 
TIME is defined as the calendar year minus 1992; SOX is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the 
observation is from year 2002 through 2006. Industry control dummies are included. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Risky Investments  
1992 – 2006 
, 0 1 2 3 4





j t jt jt jt jt
jt jt jt jt jt
jtjt jt
INVEST Lag INVEST LOGASSET LOGSALES RETURN
STDROA M B AGE COMP VAR TIME
SOX COMP VAR SOX
α α α α α
α α α α α
α α ε
= + × + × + ×Δ + ×
+ × + × + × + × + ×
+ × + × × +
 
 
Independent Variable ( jtVARCOMP _ )  
Panel A  Panel B  
 
L_ jtINCENTIVESEQUITY _  
Coef. 
(t-stat) 
jtCOMPCASH _  
Coef. 
(t-stat) 
Intercept 0.023 (4.66)*** 
0.041 
(5.12)*** 
L_INVEST 0.767 (9.87)*** 
0.812 
(9.54)*** 
LOGASSET -0.002 (-2.94)*** 
-0.003 
(-4.36)*** 
LOGSALESΔ  -0.002 (-4.21)*** 
-0.001 
(-3.67)*** 
RETURN -0.007 (-5.06)*** 
-0.008 
(-7.89)*** 
STDROA 0.405 (3.68)*** 
0.384 
(4.06)*** 
M_B 0.005 (4.35)*** 
0.004 
(3.94)*** 
AGE -0.216 (-2.19)** 
-0.196 
(-1.98)** 
COMP_VAR 0.248 (5.96)*** 
0.006 
(1.68)* 
TIME 0.217 (4.37)*** 
0.208 
(3.95)*** 
SOX -0.092 (-5.09)*** 
-0.086 
(-3.81)*** 
COMP_VAR× SOX -0.087 (-3.51)*** 
0.032 
(2.04)** 
   
N 14,013 14,013 
R-SQUARE 0.241 0.234 
***Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  T-statistics in 
parentheses are based on robust firm-clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2007). 
INVEST is total investments calculated as the sum of  research and development expenditures, acquisitions, and net 
capital expenditures (capital expenditures less sale of property, plant, and equipment) made by the firm divided by 
average total assets;  STD_RET  is measured as the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns; L_INVEST is 
the lag variable of INVEST; LOGASSET is the logarithm of total assets; ΔLOGSALES is the change in the natural 
logarithm of sales from the prior year; RETURN is the cumulative 12 months returns for year t for firm j; STDROA is 
the standard deviation of ROA over the five years period prior to the current year; M_B is the market-to-book ratio; 
AGE is the CEO’s age; COMP_VAR  is either L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES or CASH_COMP where 
L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES are defined as the logarithm of: 1%*(share price)*(number of shares held) + 1%*(share 
price)*(option delta)*(the number of options held) and CASH_COMP is the sum of salary and bonus, divided by total 
compensation; TIME is defined as the calendar year minus 1992; SOX is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the 
observation is from year 2002 through 2006. Industry control dummies are included. 
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Table 5: Future Stock Return Volatility 
1992 – 2006 
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                           Coef.                            t-stat. 
Intercept  0.824                            8.61*** 
L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES  0.130                            7.34*** 
CASH_COMP -0.084                          -2.21** 
INVEST  0.187                            5.67*** 
LEVERAGE  0.031                            3.94*** 
F_AGE                               -0.195                          -5.81*** 
LOGASSET -0.041                          -4.37*** 
TIME  0. 152                           6.82*** 
SOX -0.168                          -4.58*** 
L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES× SOX -0.091                          -5.32*** 
CASH_COMP× SOX   0.131                           3.04*** 




***Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  T-statistics in parentheses 
are based on robust firm-clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2007). 
 
STD_RET is stock return volatility and is measured as the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns.; 
L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES are defined as the logarithm of: 1%*(share price)*(number of shares held) + 1%*(share 
price)*(option delta)*(the number of options held); CASH_COMP is the sum of salary and bonus, divided by total 
compensation; INVEST is total investments calculated as the sum of  research and development expenditures, acquisitions, and 
net capital expenditures (capital expenditures less sale of property, plant, and equipment) made by the firm divided by average 
total assets;  STD_RET  is measured as the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns; LEVERAGE is total debt 
divided by total assets; F_AGE is the number of years the firm appears in Compustat; LOGASSET is the logarithm of total 
assets; Time is defined as the calendar year minus 1992; SOX is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the observation is from 






Table 6: Future Return on Assets 





















                     Coef.                t-stat. 
Intercept -0.015                 -9.87*** 
L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES     0.013                   6.56*** 
CASH_COMP  0.023                   4.46*** 
INVEST  0.045                  3.76*** 
SALES  0.002                   2.23** 
STDROA -0.179                 -2.18** 
TIME  0.003                   5.85*** 
SOX -0.012                 -4.96*** 
L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES× SOX  0.008                   0.49 
CASH_COMP× SOX  0.011                   1.03 




***Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.  T-statistics in 
parentheses are based on robust firm-clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2007). 
 
ROA is the one year ahead return on assets defined as operating income adjusted for R&D expenditures divided by 
average total assets; L_EQUITY_INCENTIVES are defined as the logarithm of: 1%*(share price)*(number of shares 
held) + 1%*(share price)*(option delta)*(the number of options held); CASH_COMP is the sum of salary and 
bonus, divided by total compensation; INVEST is total investments calculated as the sum of  research and 
development expenditures, acquisitions, and net capital expenditures (capital expenditures less sale of property, 
plant, and equipment) made by the firm divided by average total assets;  STD_RET  is measured as the annualized 
standard deviation of daily stock returns; SALES is annual sales STDROA is the standard deviation of the return on 
assets for the prior five years; Time is defined as the calendar year minus 1992; SOX is a dummy variable taking a 








Table 7: Panel A 
Legislative Events Related to SOX 
Event Window Description of Event 
2/1/2002 –  2/4/2002 Treasury Secretary called for changes in rules governing corporations 
7/8/2002 – 7/12/2002 Senate debated Sarbanes’ bill and President Bush delivered a speech on corporate 
reforms. The passage of Sarbanes’ bill is likely. On 7/10/2002 the Senate passed a 
though amendment to strengthen criminal penalties 97 to 0. 
7/18/2002 – 7/23/2002 House Republican leaders reportedly retreated from efforts to dilute the Senate’s 
tough bill. 
7/24/2002 – 7/26/2002 Senate and House agreed on the final rule. Senate and House passed SOX. 
The above table lists four key legislative events related to the passage and implementation of SOX which were found to have 
significant negative market reactions in Zhang (2007).   
 
 
Table 7: Panel B 
Risky Investments and SOX, Decile Analysis 
Decile Before SOX: 1997-2001 (a) 
After SOX: 2002-2006 
(b) 
Difference   
(a) – (b) 
  INVEST STD_RET INVEST STD_RET INVEST STD_RET 
(1) 0.169 0.758 0.126 0.438 0.043 0.320** 
(2) 0.131 0.625 0.089 0.369 0.042 0.256** 
(3) 0.129 0.592 0.083 0.337 0.049 0.255** 
(4) 0.133 0.528 0.091 0.313 0.042 0.215** 
(5) 0.102 0.505 0.082 0.307 0.021 0.198** 
(6) 0.106 0.488 0.083 0.287 0.023 0.201** 
(7) 0.117 0.478 0.084 0.261 0.033 0.217** 
(8) 0.144 0.544 0.107 0.302 0.037 0.242** 
(9) 0.122 0.540 0.101 0.326 0.021 0.214** 
(10) 0.155 0.614 0.132 0.374 0.023 0.240** 
(10) – (1) -0.014*** -0.144** 0.006** -0.064** -0.020*** -0.080*** 
***Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.   
 
This table reports the differences in risky investments made before and after SOX by firms separated into 
deciles based on the reactions to key legislative events related to SOX. Decile (1) corresponds to the portfolio 
of firms that had the most negative impact, i.e., the lowest cumulative abnormal returns around the events listed 
in Table 7, Panel A, and decile (10) corresponds to the portfolio of firms that had the least negative impact  
around these events; INVEST is total investments calculated as the sum of  research and development 
expenditures, acquisitions, and net capital expenditures (capital expenditures less sale of property, plant, and 
equipment) made by the firm divided by average total assets;  STD_RET  is stock return volatility an is 




Table 7: Panel C 
Risky Investments and SOX, 3 Group Analysis 
Group Before SOX: 1997-2001 (a) 
After SOX: 2002-2006 
(b) 
Difference   
(a) – (b) 
  INVEST STD_RET INVEST STD_RET INVEST STD_RET 
(1) 0.143 0.663 0.099 0.384 0.044*** 0.279*** 
       
(2) 0.112 0.524 0.085 0.297 0.029*** 0.227*** 
       
(3) 0.140 0.564 0.113 0.314 0.027*** 0.250*** 
       
(3) –(1) -0.003** -0.099*** 0.015*** -0.071*** -0.018*** -0.029*** 
***Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level.   
 
This table reports the differences in risky investments made before and after SOX by firms separated into three groups 
based on the reactions to key legislative events related to SOX. Group (1) corresponds to the portfolio of 33.33% of 
firms that had the most negative impact, i.e., the lowest cumulative abnormal returns around the events listed in Table 
7, Panel A, and group (3) corresponds to the portfolio of 33.33% of firms that had the least negative impact around 
these events; INVEST is total investments calculated as the sum of  research and development expenditures, 
acquisitions, and net capital expenditures (capital expenditures less sale of property, plant, and equipment) made by the 
firm divided by average total assets; STD_RET  is stock return volatility an is measured as the annualized standard 
deviation of daily stock returns.  
 
 
